

1 **WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD**  
2 **STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

3  
4 **MIGUEL PENA,**

5 *Applicant,*

6 **vs.**

7 **AQUA SYSTEMS; ATHENS**  
8 **ADMINISTRATORS CONCORD,**

9 *Defendants.*

**Case No. ADJ10308959**  
**(San Luis Obispo District Office)**

**OPINION AND ORDERS  
DISMISSING PETITION  
FOR REMOVAL,  
GRANTING PETITION  
FOR RECONSIDERATION  
AND DECISION  
AFTER RECONSIDERATION**

10 Defendant seeks removal in response to the Findings and Award (F&A) issued by the workers'  
11 compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) on December 14, 2018. By the F&A, the WCJ found that  
12 there was an unreasonable delay in authorizing medical care. A penalty of 25% of the first visit with Dr.  
13 Lorant and attorney's fees were awarded in the F&A.

14 Defendant contends that there was not an unreasonable delay in authorizing medical treatment  
15 and it will be substantially prejudiced and irreparably harmed by the imposition of penalties and  
16 attorney's fees. Defendant also contends that an attorney's fee is improper because there was not a prior  
17 award for psychiatric treatment.

18 We received an answer from applicant. The WCJ filed a Report & Recommendation on Petition  
19 for Removal (Report) recommending that we dismiss the Petition as one for removal and deny the  
20 Petition as one for reconsideration.

21 We have considered the allegations of defendant's Petition for Removal, applicant's answer and  
22 the contents of the WCJ's Report with respect thereto. Based on our review of the record and for the  
23 reasons discussed below, we will dismiss defendant's Petition as one for removal and grant the Petition  
24 as one for reconsideration. As our decision after reconsideration, we will rescind the F&A and issue new  
25 findings of fact to include: a finding of injury arising out of and in the course of employment  
26 (AOE/COE) to the psyche, there was an unreasonable delay in authorizing medical care, applicant is  
27 entitled to a 25% penalty on his first visit with Dr. Lorant and no attorney's fees may be assessed. An

1 award will be made for the penalty owed to applicant pursuant to the findings of fact.

2 **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

3 Applicant claims injury to the head, neck, back, shoulders and psyche on October 5, 2015 while  
4 employed as a purchasing agent/laborer by Aqua Systems. Defendant ~~disputes liability~~ for injury to  
5 applicant's psyche, but not to the other body parts pled.

6 The matter initially went to trial on November 13, 2017. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of  
7 Evidence, November 13, 2017.) The parties stipulated that applicant sustained injury AOE/COE to his  
8 head, neck, back and shoulders. (*Id.* at p. 2.) The issues included "[n]eed for further medical treatment"  
9 and claimed penalties for untimely paying of mileage and unreasonably failing to authorize medications.  
10 (*Id.*) On December 5, 2017, the WCJ issued a Findings and Award finding that applicant "is in need of  
11 future medical care" and awarded a 25% penalty for defendant's failure to timely pay mileage. (Findings  
12 and Award, December 5, 2017, p. 1.) The award included future medical treatment and a penalty  
13 pursuant to Labor Code section 5814 in accordance with the findings of fact. (Lab. Code, § 5814.)<sup>1</sup>

14 Subsequent to the December 5, 2017 award, Jamie Rotnofsky, Ph.D., evaluated applicant as the  
15 psychological panel qualified medical evaluator (QME) on December 22, 2017. (Applicant's Exhibit  
16 No. 5, Dr. Rotnofsky's Report, January 16, 2018, p. 1.) Dr. Rotnofsky diagnosed applicant with major  
17 depression, pain disorder and cognitive disorder. (*Id.* at p. 42.) It was noted by Dr. Rotnofsky that "there  
18 are no notes reflecting that Mr. Pena had received psychological treatment." (*Id.*) He opined that  
19 applicant's "depression/anxiety and cognitive disorder are considered to be 100% industrially-based."  
20 (*Id.* at p. 43.) Future treatment recommendations were made for psychiatric, psychological and  
21 neuropsychological treatment. (*Id.* at p. 46.) Dr. Rotnofsky's opinions remained unchanged in a  
22 supplemental report issued in April 2018 following review of additional records. (Applicant's Exhibit  
23 No. 6, Dr. Rotnofsky's Report, April 2, 2018, p. 5.)

24 On July 6, 2018, applicant sent a letter to defendant requesting authorization for treatment with  
25 Nir Lorant, M.D., as a secondary treater for psyche. (Applicant's Exhibit No. 7, Mr. Herreras' letter,  
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27  

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<sup>1</sup> All further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise stated.

1 July 6, 2018.) Defendant responded to the letter via email asking “if there has been an RFA [request for  
2 authorization] for sessions with Dr. Lorant.” (Applicant’s Exhibit No. 8, Email, July 12, 2018.)

3 On August 15, 2018, applicant filed a Declaration of **Readiness** to Proceed on the issue of  
4 treatment for his psyche, as well as a Petition for **Penalties** under section 5814 and attorney’s fees under  
5 section 5814.5. (Lab. Code, §§ **5814, 5814.5.**)

6 Applicant and defendant exchanged emails from October 23-24, 2018, wherein defendant  
7 provided applicant with a link to its medical provider network (MPN). (Applicant’s Exhibit No. 11,  
8 Email, October 24, 2018.) On October 25, 2018, applicant sent defendant a letter advising that there are  
9 no psychiatry or psychology specialists in defendant’s MPN within the counties of Santa Barbara and  
10 San Luis Obispo. (Applicant’s Exhibit No. 12, Letter of Mr. Herreras, October 25, 2018.) Applicant  
11 contended that defendant’s “MPN is defective.” (*Id.*) Treatment with Dr. Lorant was requested again.  
12 (*Id.*)

13 The matter proceeded to trial again on October 29, 2018. The issues included injury AOE/COE  
14 to the psyche, a penalty for failure to promptly provide or authorize medical care to the psyche and fees  
15 under section 5814.5 if a penalty is assessed. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence, October  
16 29, 2018, p. 2; Lab. Code, § 5814.5.) The Minutes note that defendant authorized treatment with Dr.  
17 Lorant on October 25, 2018. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence, October 29, 2018, p. 2.)

18 In the resulting F&A, the WCJ found that there was an unreasonable delay in authorizing medical  
19 care, assessed a penalty of 25% of the first visit with Dr. Lorant and found that applicant’s attorney was  
20 entitled to fees under section 5814.5 in an amount to be adjusted between the parties. In the Opinion on  
21 Decision, the WCJ opines as follows:

22 Turning to the issues at hand, based on the reports of Dr. Rotnofsky and  
23 notably the report of January 16, 2018, (Applicant’s Exhibit 5) the  
24 undersigned has little doubt in concluding that applicant did sustain injury  
25 AOE/COE to the psyche. The reports are very clear and the reports  
26 reasoning are certainly solid that the applicant did sustain the injury as  
alleged. There is no contrary evidence. Dr. Rotnofsky concludes that  
applicant is in need of future medical care.  
(Opinion on Decision, December 14, 2018, p. 3.)

27 The F&A does not contain a finding of fact regarding injury AOE/COE to applicant’s psyche.

1 In his Report, the WCJ states that defendant improperly filed a petition for removal since the  
2 F&A is a final order and is therefore subject to reconsideration. (WCJ's Report, December 27, 2018, p.  
3 1.) The WCJ further reiterated that he found that applicant sustained injury AOE/COE to his psyche  
4 based on the reporting of Dr. Rotnofsky. (*Id.* at p. 2.) The WCJ noted that applicant made a demand for  
5 treatment with Dr. Lorant on July 6, 2018, and defendant did not authorize this treatment until October  
6 25, 2018. (*Id.*) This was found to be an unreasonable delay by the WCJ, resulting in the award for a  
7 penalty and a fee for applicant's attorney.

## 8 DISCUSSION

### 9 I.

10 The WCJ in his Report raises the issue of whether defendant should have sought removal or  
11 reconsideration of the F&A. A petition for reconsideration may only be taken from a "final" order,  
12 decision, or award. (Lab. Code, §§ 5900(a), 5902, 5903.) A "final" order has been defined as one that  
13 either "determines any substantive right or liability of those involved in the case" (*Rymer v. Hagler*  
14 (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1180; *Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Pointer)*  
15 (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 528, 534-535 [45 Cal.Comp.Cases 410, 413]; *Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v.*  
16 *Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kramer)* (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 39, 45 [43 Cal.Comp.Cases 661, 665]) or  
17 determines a "threshold" issue that is fundamental to the claim for benefits. (*Maranian v. Workers'*  
18 *Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1070, 1075 [65 Cal.Comp.Cases 650, 650-651, 655-  
19 656].) The Court of Appeal has given examples of threshold issues as including "whether the injury  
20 arises out of and in the course of employment, the territorial jurisdiction of the appeals board, the  
21 existence of an employment relationship or statute of limitations issues." (*Capital Builders Hardware,*  
22 *Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Gaona)* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 658, 662, citations omitted.) "Such  
23 issues, if finally determined, may avoid the necessity of further litigation." (*Id.*, internal quotation marks  
24 and citations omitted.)

25 Defendant petitioned for removal rather than reconsideration of the F&A. In the F&A, the WCJ  
26 only made findings that there was an unreasonable delay in authorizing medical care, assessed a 25%  
27 penalty and found attorney's attorney was entitled to fees.



1 the effects of an industrial injury. (Lab. Code, § 4600(a).) Medical treatment is considered part of  
2 compensation and subject to penalties under section 5814. (See Lab. Code, § 3207; see also *Mote v.*  
3 *Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 902 [62 Cal.Comp.Cases 891]; *Davison v.*  
4 *Industrial Acc. Com.* (1966) 21 Cal.App.2d 15 [31 Cal. Comp. Cases 77].) Section 5814 provides for  
5 penalties as follows:

6           When payment of compensation has been unreasonably delayed or refused,  
7           either prior to or subsequent to the issuance of an award, the amount of the  
8           payment unreasonably delayed or refused shall be increased up to 25  
9           percent or up to ten thousand dollars (\$10,000), whichever is less. In any  
          proceeding under this section, the appeals board shall use its discretion to  
          accomplish a fair balance and substantial justice between the parties.

10           (Lab. Code, § 5814(a).)

11           The burden is on applicant to show a delay in the provision of benefits. (Lab. Code, § 5705 [the  
12 burden of proof is on the party holding the affirmative of the issue].) Once applicant establishes a delay  
13 in the provision of benefits, the burden shifts to defendant to prove that the delay was reasonable.  
14 (*Kerley v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 223, 230 [36 Cal.Comp.Cases 152]; see also  
15 *Kamel v. West Cliff Medical* (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 1521, 1523 (Appeals Board en banc); *Berry v.*  
16 *Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 381, 383 [34 Cal.Comp.Cases 507] ["Once delay  
17 is shown, a satisfactory explanation must be made by the employer".]) The Court of Appeal has held that  
18 in the event of a delay of benefits, the "only satisfactory excuse...is genuine doubt from a medical or  
19 legal standpoint as to liability for benefits, and that the burden is on the employer or his carrier to present  
20 substantial evidence on which a finding of such doubt may be based." (*Kerley, supra*, at p. 227.)  
21 Whether a delay in delivery of benefits is unreasonable is a question of fact to be resolved by the Appeals  
22 Board. (See *Gallamore v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 815 [44 Cal.Comp.Cases  
23 321].)

24           Applicant's psychiatric condition was found to be industrially caused by the QME Dr. Rotnofsky  
25 in his January 16, 2018 report and treatment recommended for this condition. The record does not reflect  
26 that defendant raised any issues with Dr. Rotnofsky's conclusions regarding causation or attempted to  
27 conduct further discovery to challenge those conclusions prior to or during the October 29, 2018 trial.

1 The record therefore does not support genuine doubt by defendant from a medical or legal standpoint for  
2 liability for benefits in relation to applicant's psychiatric condition. Once applicant requested treatment  
3 for his psychiatric condition per his July 6, 2018 request, defendant was obligated to provide it.

4 Defendant contends that no valid request for authorization (RFA) for psychiatric treatment has  
5 been issued, which has precluded it from conducting utilization review (UR) of the treatment  
6 recommendations pursuant to section 4610. (Lab. Code, § 4610.) Defendant fails to cite any authority  
7 for its contention that the mere selection of a physician to provide medical treatment itself constitutes a  
8 RFA for a "specific course of proposed medical treatment" subject to UR. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§  
9 9785(g), 9792.6.1(t).) There is no specific course of treatment being proposed by applicant's selection of  
10 Dr. Lorant as a secondary treater; this is simply a request for an opportunity to be seen by a psychiatrist  
11 who can then report to applicant's primary treating physician (PTP) on what treatment, if any, is  
12 necessary to cure or relieve from the effects of applicant's psychiatric condition. (See Cal. Code Regs.,  
13 tit. 8, § 9785(e)(3)-(4).) Defendant remains entitled and obligated to submit treatment recommendations  
14 for applicant's psychiatric condition to UR. (§ 4610.)

15 The Petition is not a model of clarity, but it appears that defendant also contends that the July 6,  
16 2018 request from applicant for psychiatric treatment with Dr. Lorant cannot be a valid request for  
17 treatment because it was not a referral from the PTP. Defendant suggests that only a PTP may make a  
18 request for treatment with a secondary treating physician. It is acknowledged that an employee may only  
19 have one PTP and that the PTP is primarily responsible for managing the employee's care. (Cal. Code  
20 Regs., tit. 8, § 9785(a)(1) and (b)(1).) The PTP is also responsible for obtaining all of the reports from  
21 secondary physicians. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 9785(e)(4).) However, defendant does not specifically  
22 cite to any statutory law or regulation that expressly requires a referral for treatment with a secondary  
23 treating physician to come from the PTP. This contention is therefore without merit.

24 Defendant did not produce any evidence at trial to explain why applicant's July 6, 2018 request to  
25 designate Dr. Lorant as a secondary physician for psyche was not complied with until October 25, 2018,  
26 a delay of approximately three and a half months. This delay was unreasonable since no satisfactory  
27 reason was provided by defendant for its refusal to comply with this request during this period. The WCJ

1 therefore acted within his discretion to impose a 25% penalty under section 5814. (See *Ramirez v. Drive*  
2 *Financial Services* (2008) 73 Cal.Comp.Cases 1324, 1328 (Appeals Board en banc) [discretion is  
3 required by the WCJ in setting the amount of the penalty under section 5814].)

4 Defendant's delay in providing treatment for applicant's psyche was unreasonable and a penalty  
5 of 25% of applicant's first visit with Dr. Lorant is justified.

6 **III.**

7 Defendant contends that psychiatric treatment for applicant was authorized on October 25, 2018,  
8 prior to the issuance of an award for treatment to this body part. Defendant therefore contends that an  
9 award for an attorney's fee cannot be made under section 5814.5 for an unreasonable delay in providing  
10 this treatment since there was no prior award for psychiatric treatment.

11 Section 5814.5 states in full:

12 When the payment of compensation has been unreasonably delayed or  
13 refused *subsequent to the issuance of an award* by an employer that has  
14 secured the payment of compensation pursuant to Section 3700, the appeals  
15 board shall, in addition to increasing the order, decision, or award pursuant  
16 to Section 5814, award reasonable attorneys' fees *incurred in enforcing the*  
17 *payment of compensation awarded.*

18 (Lab. Code, § 5814.5, emphasis added.)

19 In *Ramirez*, the en banc decision opined regarding a fee under section 5814.5 as follows, in  
20 pertinent part:

21 The right to seek attorney's fees under section 5814.5 comes into existence  
22 only after applicant has been awarded compensation and defendant has  
23 unreasonably delayed payment.

24 ...  
25 We emphasize, however, that a section 5814.5 fee is payable only where  
26 there has been a prior award of benefits, that defendant has unreasonably  
27 delayed payment of some or all of that award, and the applicant has  
incurred attorney's fees in enforcing the prior award. If there is no prior  
award, or no unreasonable delay, section 5814.5 fees shall not be awarded.  
*Moreover, section 5814.5 fees should be allowed only for legal services*  
*rendered in "enforcing" the unreasonably delayed prior award, and not*  
*for any other purpose.*

(*Ramirez, supra*, 73 Cal.Comp.Cases at pp. 1334 and 1336, emphasis  
added.)

1 The language in *Ramirez* is quite unambiguous. A fee under section 5814.5 is only payable  
2 where there is *a prior award* of benefits, there is an unreasonable delay in payment of some or all of *that*  
3 award, and applicant has incurred attorney's fees in *enforcing the prior award*. The majority believes  
4 that permitting an attorney's fee under section 5814.5 where there has been *any* prior award of the same  
5 species of benefits conflicts with the statute's plain language, as well as our previous, binding  
6 interpretation of this statute in *Ramirez*. Fees under this section are only permissible where applicant has  
7 incurred fees in specifically enforcing a prior award. That did not occur here.

8 This matter previously went to trial regarding applicant's need for future medical care on  
9 November 13, 2017. A Findings and Award issued on December 5, 2017 finding that applicant was in  
10 need of future medical care and awarded future medical treatment. However, at that trial, the parties had  
11 stipulated that applicant sustained injury AOE/COE to his head, neck, back and shoulders. The issue of  
12 injury AOE/COE to the psyche and the need for treatment to the psyche was not raised at that time.  
13 Additionally, Dr. Rotnofsky had not yet evaluated applicant or issued his reports until after the first  
14 award issued. It logically follows that the prior December 5, 2017 award for treatment was only for the  
15 body parts stipulated to be injured. There was no prior award for treatment to applicant's psyche at the  
16 time of the October 29, 2018 trial. In other words, the second trial was not conducted to enforce a prior  
17 award so there can be no award for attorney's fees under section 5814.5. We therefore agree with  
18 defendant that it was improper to award a fee to applicant's attorney under section 5814.5 as part of the  
19 December 14, 2018 F&A.

20 In conclusion, we will grant defendant's Petition as one seeking reconsideration, rescind the F&A  
21 and substitute it with a new findings of fact and award. The new findings will include a finding of injury  
22 AOE/COE to the psyche, there was an unreasonable delay in authorizing medical care, applicant is  
23 entitled to a 25% penalty on applicant's first visit with Dr. Lorant and no fees may be assessed under  
24 section 5814.5. An award will be made for the penalty under section 5814.

25 For the foregoing reasons,

26 **IT IS ORDERED** that defendant's Petition for Removal of the Findings and Award issued by the  
27 WCJ on December 14, 2018 is **DISMISSED**.



1 AWARD

2 **AWARD IS MADE** in favor of **MIGUEL PENA**, against **AQUA**  
3 **SYSTEMS** and **ATHENS ADMINISTRATORS** as follows:


4 (a) A penalty in accordance with finding of fact number 3.

5 **WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD**

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
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8 **DEIDRA E. LOWE**

9 **I CONCUR,**

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13 **JOSÉ H. RAZO**

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15 **I DISSENT, (See Attached Dissenting Opinion.)**

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19 **MARGUERITE SWEENEY**



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21 **DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA**

22 **FEB 25 2019**

23 **SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR**  
24 **ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.**

25 **ADELSON, TESTAN, BRUNDO, NOVELL & JIMENEZ**  
26 **MIGUEL PENA**  
27 **WILLIAM A. HERRERAS**

*AI/pc*

**PENA, Miguel**

1                   **CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION OF COMMISSIONER SWEENEY**

2                   I respectfully dissent. I concur with sections I-II of the decision. However, I disagree with the  
3 analysis in section III and would retain the award for attorney’s fees under section 5814.5 in the F&A.

4                   I have previously opined on when fees may be imposed under section 5814.5 in a dissenting  
5 opinion:

6                   But, more importantly, I believe that section 5814.5 allows payment of  
7 reasonable attorney’s fees for a defendant’s delay or refusal to pay after *an*  
8 *award* has been made. I do not see that section 5814.5 only applies to  
9 those narrow circumstances where a defendant refuses to pay for a benefit  
10 item that has already been awarded and an attorney seeks to enforce  
11 payment of that item. I also observe that when a defendant refuses to  
12 comply with an order to pay a specific benefit item, section 5813 remedies  
13 could apply, which allow for imposition of sanctions and recovery of  
14 reasonable attorney’s fees, so that a narrow reading of section 5814.5  
15 seems duplicative.

16                   Instead, I believe that the statute...more reasonably [reads] to say that once  
17 an applicant has an award of benefits, thereafter, whenever a defendant  
18 [unreasonably] refuses or delays payment on any item which would fall  
19 within that species of awarded benefits, applicant’s attorney is entitled to  
20 payment under section 5814.5, *whether the particular item has been*  
21 *awarded or not*. Many times, a penalty recovery is minimal, and the  
22 amount of attorney time required to enforce payment is disproportionately  
23 large. Section 5814.5 encourages attorneys to pursue enforcement, and  
24 discourages defendants from failing to pay, and my reading fits squarely  
25 within this intent.

26                   (*White v. Whole Foods* (December 17, 2012, ADJ7818660) [2012 Cal.  
27 Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 674, \*10-11], emphasis in original.)<sup>3</sup>

28                   In *White*, applicant was awarded temporary disability from July 8, 2010 through July 1, 2011 with  
29 the issue of temporary disability beginning July 2, 2011 and thereafter deferred. Subsequent to the  
30 award, in November 2011, applicant’s treating physician found him temporarily disabled back to July

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31 <sup>3</sup> Unlike en banc decisions, panel decisions are not binding precedent on other Appeals Board panels and WCJs. (See *Gee v.*  
32 *Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1425 fn. 6 [67 Cal.Comp.Cases 236].) However, panel decisions  
33 are citable authority and we consider these decisions to the extent that we find their reasoning persuasive, particularly on  
34 issues of contemporaneous administrative construction of statutory language. (See *Guitron v. Santa Fe Extruders* (2011) 76  
35 Cal.Comp.Cases 228, fn. 7 (Appeals Board En Banc); *Griffith v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1260,  
36 1264, fn. 2, [54 Cal.Comp.Cases 145].) I refer to *White* because it considered a similar issue.

1 2011. Defendant resumed temporary disability as of November 29, 2011, but did not provide temporary  
2 disability from July 2, 2011 to November 28, 2011 due to an asserted lack of evidence to support work  
3 status. Applicant sought penalties under sections 5814 and 5814.5. The WCJ awarded applicant  
4 temporary disability during the disputed period, as well as a 25% penalty and attorney's fees under  
5 section 5814.5. The award for attorney's fees under section 5814.5 was rescinded by the Appeals Board,  
6 which applicant challenged on reconsideration. The majority panelists denied applicant's petition for  
7 reconsideration of the prior Opinion and Order, to which I dissented per the analysis above. Since  
8 applicant had previously been awarded temporary disability, I opined that his attorney was entitled to a  
9 fee under section 5814.5 to enforce payment of the benefit of temporary disability indemnity.

10 In this matter, there was a prior award for medical care before the October 29, 2018 trial. After  
11 the psychological QME Dr. Rotnofsky opined that applicant's psychiatric condition was industrially  
12 caused and recommended future medical care for this body part, defendant was obligated to provide that  
13 care. Defendant has given no valid explanation for delaying authorization of this treatment once  
14 applicant requested it. There is therefore no question that defendant unreasonably delayed medical care  
15 for applicant's industrial injury.


16 As in *White*, there was a prior award for the species of benefits for which applicant sought  
17 attorney's fees under section 5814.5. Applicant incurred attorney's fees to enforce his right to medical  
18 care. Since there was a prior award for medical care, applicant's attorney is entitled to fees for  
19 defendant's unreasonable delay in providing medical care to which applicant is entitled.

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1 I therefore respectfully dissent with section III of the above opinion. I would retain the finding of  
2 an entitlement to an attorney's fee under section 5814.5 and include an award for this fee in our  
3 substituted findings of fact and award.



**WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD**

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
**MARGUERITE SWEENEY, COMMISSIONER**

9 **DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA**

10  
11 **FEB 25 2019**

12 **SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR**  
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15 **MIGUEL PENA**  
16 **WILLIAM A. HERRERAS**

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*AI/pc*

**WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD  
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

ADJ10308959

MIGUEL PENA

v.

AQUA SYSTEMS;  
ATHENS ADMINISTRATORS

**REPORT & RECOMMENDATION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION JUDGE  
ON PETITION FOR REMOVAL**

**I  
INTRODUCTION**

As reflected in the Minutes of Hearing dated \_\_\_\_\_, applicant, born June 4, 1958, while employed as a purchasing agent/laborer, sustained injury arising out of and in the course of employment to his head, neck, back and shoulders on October 5, 2015.

On December 14, 2018, a Findings and Award issued which found that defendants had unreasonably delayed the authorization of psychiatric care, that defendants were liable for a penalty under Labor Code Section 5814, and that defendants were liable for fees to applicant's counsel under Labor Code Section 5814.5.

Defendant has filed a Petition for Removal contending: 1) that petitioner will suffer substantial prejudice and irreparable harm if removal is not granted; 2) that petitioner did not unreasonably delay the authorization of medical care; 3) that future psychiatric care was not previously awarded; 4) and that inferentially, the fees under Labor Code Section 5814.5 were inappropriate.

Before going further, the undersigned is certain that the Board has noted that this Petition is captioned as a "Petition for Removal."

The undersigned found that the defendants had unreasonably delayed in authorizing psychiatric care, that the action warranted a penalty and that applicant's attorney was entitled to fees under Labor Code Section 5814.5. Clearly, these are adjudication of rights between applicant and defendant obligating defendant to pay monies and are final orders. As such, removal is not the appropriate remedy. A Petition for Reconsideration is the appropriate remedy.

The Board may wish to consider dismissing this Petition as simply improper. The undersigned recognizes that the Board, at its discretion, may consider this to be a valid Petition for Reconsideration, for then the undersigned will discuss petitioner's arguments below as if this were a proper Petition for Reconsideration.

## II DISCUSSION

The undersigned issued an earlier decision in this case, dated December 5, 2017. In that Decision, the undersigned found that applicant had sustained injury AOE/COE to his head, neck, back and shoulders on October 5, 2015, and that applicant was in need of future medical care. At the hearing on October 18, which resulted in the complained-of decision, the issues were: injury AOE/COE to the psyche, a claimed penalty for failing to properly authorize that treatment to the psyche, and fees under Labor Code Section 5814.5 should a penalty be assessed.

In terms of injury AOE/COE to the psyche, the undersigned found that based on the reports of Dr. Rotnofsky and specifically his report of January 16, 20<sup>1</sup>/<sub>18</sub> (applicant's Exhibit "5"), the applicant did sustain injury AOE/COE to the psyche. The undersigned also noted that there was no contrary evidence and Dr. Rotnofsky concluded that applicant was in need of future medical care.

By letter of July 6, 2018 (applicant's Exhibit "7"), applicant made demand for treatment with Dr. Lorant, a local psychiatrist. At the hearing on October 29, 2018, as reflected in the Minutes, the parties agreed that defendants did authorize psychiatric care with Dr. Lorant on October 25, 2018.

The undersigned found this to be an unreasonable delay.

As noted above, the panel QME, Dr. Rotnofsky, found injury to the psyche and that applicant was in need of future medical care. This report is dated January 16, 2018. Applicant made demand for care with a psychiatrist on July 6, 2018, and the care was not authorized until October 25, 2018.

This is an unreasonable delay. Furthermore, under Labor Code Section 4063, when an AME or QME resolve an issue that requires the defendant to provide a benefit, the defendant has the obligation to provide that benefit or to file a Declaration of Readiness to Proceed. Defendants did neither.

Petitioner also complains that the undersigned allowed a fee under Labor Code Section 5814.5 when psychiatric care was not previously awarded. Clearly, applicant was awarded future medical care in the award that issued in December of 2017. The fact that it wasn't psychiatric care makes no difference. There is no doubt, and the petitioner does not contend otherwise, that psychiatric care is part and parcel of applicant's injury. Simply put, if an industrial injury causes need for medical treatment to another part of the body, it is still part of the award of future medical treatment. For example, if applicant were to slip and fall because of his industrial injury and injure his knee, one would not need a specific award to render treatment to the knee as long as causation is clear. There is no difference in the case at hand. And because there was an award of future medical in existence, applicant's attorney is entitled to fees under Labor Code Section 5814.5.

Defendants' argument about substantial prejudice is, in the undersigned's opinion, misplaced. As the undersigned pointed out above, the complained-of decision is a final order, not subject to removal.

Petition argues that since there was no RFA, there was no opportunity for Utilization Review to approve, modify, or deny medical treatment.

Petitioner really is attempting to place the applicant in a "Catch 22" situation; defendants certainly have a right to exercise Utilization Review but they have to let the person see the doctor in the first place to find out what the physician proposes.

Finally, petitioner argues that the award of medical care did not include psychiatric where injury was in dispute.

This has been discussed above wherein the undersigned pointed out that Labor Code Section 4063 mandates that defendant provide a benefit when an AME or QME indicate its need and the fact that applicant was awarded future medical care does not necessarily mean a limitation

to only what was originally found, especially in light of the fact that the subsequent report that connects other care to the injury in question.

**III  
RECOMMENDATION**

If the Board in its discretion considers this an appropriate Petition for Reconsideration, it is respectfully recommended that it be denied. If the Board considers this to be a Petition for Removal, it is recommended that it be dismissed as improper.

December 27, 2018

  
MICHAEL LeCOVER  
Workers' Compensation Judge

*Please see attached Proof of Service*