

1 **WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD**

2 **STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

3 **Case No. ADJ665716 (BAK 0154393)**

4 **JUDD GLOVER,**

5 *Applicant,*

6  
7 *vs.*

8  
9 **ACCU CONSTRUCTION;  
10 **FIRST COMP OMAHA,****

11 *Defendant(s).*

12  
13 **OPINION AND DECISION  
14 **AFTER RECONSIDERATION****

15 We previously granted defendant's petition for reconsideration to further study the factual  
16 and legal issues in this case. This is our Opinion and Decision After Reconsideration. Defendant  
17 sought reconsideration of the January 26, 2009 Findings & Award, wherein the workers'  
18 compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) found, in pertinent part, that applicant, while  
19 employed on June 8, 2006, as a laborer/heavy equipment operator, sustained industrial injury to his  
20 head, brain, psyche, and eye. The WCJ found that applicant has been adequately compensated for  
21 all periods of temporary total disability through June 22, 2008. He found that applicant's injury of  
22 "June 6, 2008" was a "high-velocity eye injury" within the meaning of Labor Code section  
23 4656(c)(3)(F), and that, as a result of his injury of "June 6, 2008," applicant has been temporarily  
24 totally disabled during the period from "June 23, 2008," to the present and continuing. The WCJ  
25 awarded temporary disability indemnity from June 23, 2006, to the present and continuing, further  
26 medical treatment, and an interim attorney's fee.

27 Defendant contended that the WCJ erred in finding that applicant sustained a high-velocity  
eye injury and that, even if he did, there is no nexus between the eye injury and applicant's  
extended temporary disability. Defendant also requests correction of clerical errors regarding the

1 date of injury. Although the issue was not raised by the parties, defendant also responded to the  
2 WCJ's discussion, in the Opinion on Decision, of the Labor Code section 4656(c)(3)(C)  
3 amputation exception as an alternate ground for extended temporary disability benefits, by  
4 contending that: 1) the medical evidence does not show, and defendant does not concede, that  
5 applicant's tear duct was removed, and 2) even if it was, removal of a tear duct would not  
6 constitute an amputation, pursuant to the definition set forth in *Cruz v. Mercedes-Benz of San*  
7 *Francisco* (2007) 72 Cal.Comp.Cases 1281 (Appeals Board en banc).

8 We have considered the Petition for Reconsideration and applicant's Answer, and we have  
9 reviewed the record in this matter. The WCJ prepared a Report and Recommendation on Petition  
10 for Reconsideration (Report), recommending that we correct the clerical errors. We have not  
11 considered and have discarded the inappropriate attachments to defendant's petition.

12 For the reasons expressed by the WCJ at pages 1-10 of his Report, which we adopt and  
13 incorporate (we do not adopt and incorporate the remainder of the Report, beginning with the  
14 discussion, at page 10, of the "Second Issue"), and for the reasons discussed below, we will correct  
15 the clerical errors, defer the issues of additional temporary disability indemnity and attorney's fees,  
16 otherwise affirm, and return the matter to the trial level for development of the record and further  
17 proceedings to determine whether applicant's continuing temporary disability is caused, to any  
18 extent, by his high-velocity eye injury, thus entitling him to additional temporary disability  
19 indemnity.

20 Labor Code section 4656(c) provides in full:

21 "(c)(1) Aggregate disability payments for a single injury occurring  
22 on or after April 19, 2004, causing temporary disability shall not  
23 extend for more than 104 compensable weeks within a period of  
24 two years from the date of commencement of temporary disability  
payment.

25 (2) Aggregate disability payments for a single injury occurring on  
26 or after January 1, 2008, causing temporary disability shall not  
27 extend for more than 104 compensable weeks within a period of  
five years from the date of injury.

1 (3) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), for an employee who  
2 suffers from the following injuries or conditions, aggregate  
3 disability payments for a single injury occurring on or after April  
4 19, 2004, causing temporary disability shall not extend for more  
5 than 240 compensable weeks within a period of five years from the  
6 date of the injury:

- 7 (A) Acute and chronic hepatitis B.
- 8 (B) Acute and chronic hepatitis C.
- 9 (C) Amputations.
- 10 (D) Severe burns.
- 11 (E) Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).
- 12 (F) High-velocity eye injuries.
- 13 (G) Chemical burns to the eyes.
- 14 (H) Pulmonary fibrosis.
- 15 (I) Chronic lung disease.”

16 Defendant admits injury to “the nose, head, brain, psyche and a midline shift of the right  
17 eye as a compensable consequence but den[ies] a direct impact to the right eye.” (Minutes of  
18 Hearing and Summary of Evidence, p. 2.) Defendant does not appear to dispute that the injury was  
19 “high-velocity.” Rather, its argument is that injury was not sustained to the “eye,” defined  
20 narrowly by defendant to mean the eyeball only. We are not persuaded that “eye” should be  
21 defined so narrowly, yet we need not delineate the outer limits of our definition at this time. We  
22 have examined applicant’s medical records and find ample evidence of injury to and treatment of  
23 the right eye. The nursing and physician emergency records both contain diagrams indicating eye  
24 injury. That this eye injury may have been overshadowed by the damage caused as the metal  
25 fragment continued its path through applicant’s brain does not negate the existence of his eye  
26 injury. Defendant selectively cites descriptions of applicant’s injury which do not include  
27 discussions of the eye, or which mention the undamaged structures and functions of the eye.  
Defendant ignores those parts of the record that show laceration, repair, medication, and other  
treatment, with respect to the eye. We agree with the WCJ’s determination that applicant did  
sustain a high-velocity eye injury, and with the reasons explained in his Report.

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1 Resolution of the second issue, whether there must be a nexus between the specific  
2 exception in section 4656(c)(3) and the reason for the extended temporary disability, and whether  
3 that nexus has been demonstrated in this case, requires a deeper analysis of the statutory language.  
4 Defendant argues that, "there must be a nexus between the injury or condition and the applicant's  
5 current disability status. Therefore, Defendants contend that even if the Board finds that the  
6 Applicant suffered a 'high velocity eye injury', the Applicant is not entitled to an extension of  
7 temporary disability beyond the 104 weeks since his current temporary disability is not a result of  
8 his vision problems, but the result of a brain injury which does not fall under Labor Code Section  
9 4656 exception." (Petition for Reconsideration, pp. 8-9.)

10 Defendant argues:

11 "Statutory phrases are not to be read in isolation, rather, they must  
12 be examined in the context of the entire statute so that its different  
13 parts may be harmonized. (State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance  
14 Company v. Garamendi (2004) 32 Cal. 4<sup>th</sup> 1029, 1043 [88 P.3d 71,  
15 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 343]). Labor Code Section (c)(3) reads,

16 "...For an employee who suffers from the following injuries or  
17 conditions...causing temporary disability shall not extend for more  
18 than 240 compensable weeks within a period of five years from the  
19 date of the injury..." (Petition for Reconsideration, p. 8.)

20 While we agree with the need to harmonize the various parts of the statute, defendant's  
21 attempt to break down section 4656(c)(3) grammatically does not hold up to close examination and  
22 does not resolve the issue. Defendant reads the phrase "causing temporary disability" as modifying  
23 "injuries or conditions," and this reading would require that the enumerated exception be the cause  
24 of the continuing temporary disability. However, the language "aggregate disability payments for a  
25 single injury...causing temporary disability shall not extend for more than..." in subdivision (c)(3)  
26 is identical to the language in subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2). A more natural and consistent reading  
27 of subdivision (c)(3) is that "causing temporary disability" modifies "a single injury," and  
defendant does not dispute that applicant's temporary disability was caused by his "single injury."

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1 It does not necessarily follow, however, that any injury occurring on or after April 19, 2004,  
2 to an employee suffering from one of the enumerated injuries or conditions, causing temporary  
3 disability, entitles the employee to temporary disability indemnity beyond the two-year/104-week  
4 cap.

5 In *Foster v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2008) 161 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1505 [73 Cal.Comp.Cases  
6 466, 469-470], another case involving interpretation of section 4656, the Court of Appeal reviewed  
7 the applicable principles of statutory construction:

8 "In construing a statute, our primary task is to 'ascertain the intent  
9 of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.'  
10 (*Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com.* (1987) 43  
11 Cal.3d 1379, 1386 [743 P.2d 1323, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67] (*Dyna-  
12 Med*); see *Sacramento County Office of Education v. Workers'  
13 Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 107, 113 [97 Cal. Rptr.  
14 2d 699, 65 Cal. Comp. Cases 672].) To determine legislative  
15 intent, we begin with the language of the statute, giving the words  
16 their usual and ordinary meaning. (*Nolan v. City of Anaheim*  
17 (2004) 33 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 335, 340 [92 P.3d 350, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 857];  
18 *California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified  
19 School Dist.* (1997) 14 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 627, 633 [927 P.2d 1175, 59 Cal.  
20 Rptr. 2d 671].) We read the language in context  
21 (*Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs Grocery Co., Inc.* (2007) 42 Cal.4<sup>th</sup>  
22 217, 227 [165 P.3d 133, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 407, 72 Cal. Comp.  
23 Cases 1238]) and in harmony with the statutory framework as a  
24 whole. (*Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.*  
25 (1999) 19 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 1182, 1194 [969 P.2d 613, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521,  
26 64 Cal. Comp. Cases 1]; *Gee v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.*  
27 (2002) 96 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1418, 1427 [118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105, 67 Cal.  
Comp. Cases 236].) Where uncertainty exists in the language, we  
give consideration 'to the consequences that will flow from a  
particular interpretation. [Citation.]' (*Dyna-Med, supra*, at p.  
1387.) 'Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider  
historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in  
ascertaining the legislative intent. [Citations.]' (*Ibid.*)

24 ' "We liberally construe all aspects of workers' compensation  
25 law in favor of the injured worker." [Citation.] "[T]he so-called  
26 'liberality rule,' " however, (which is found in section 3202)  
27 "cannot supplant the intent of the Legislature as expressed in a  
particular statute." [Citation.] If the Legislature's intent appears

1 from the language and context of the relevant statutory provisions,  
2 then we must effectuate that intent, "even though the particular  
3 statutory language 'is contrary to the basic policy of the [workers'  
4 compensation law].'" [Citations.] (*Kopping v. Workers' Comp.  
Appeals Bd.* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1099, 1106 [48 Cal. Rptr. 3d  
618, 71 Cal. Comp. Cases 1229].)"

5 In *Foster*, the applicant had sustained two specific injuries — an injury to his right shoulder  
6 on February 23, 2005, and an injury to his neck, right elbow, and right shoulder on April 13, 2005.  
7 He was unable to work after April 13, 2005, due to the effects of both injuries. The WCJ found  
8 applicant entitled to two periods of temporary disability indemnity pursuant to section 4656(c)(1):  
9 the first from April 14, 2005, to September 25, 2006, when the first injury reached maximal  
10 medical improvement, and the second starting September 26, 2006, after the first period ended.  
11 The Appeals Board granted reconsideration and agreed that applicant was entitled to two periods of  
12 temporary disability indemnity because he sustained two injuries. Contrary to the finding of the  
13 WCJ, however, the Appeals Board found that, to the extent the periods of temporary disability run  
14 concurrently, the respective two-year/104-week limitations of section 4656(c)(1) also run  
15 concurrently. Hence, applicant was not entitled to temporary disability indemnity for his second  
16 injury beyond two years from the first payment of temporary disability benefits for that injury.  
17 Since the payments made by defendant were for both injuries and were first made on April 26,  
18 2005, applicant was entitled to temporary disability indemnity only until April 26, 2007. The  
19 Court determined that the Appeals Board correctly interpreted section 4656(c)(1) and affirmed our  
20 decision.

21 The Court said,

22 "The language of section 4656(c)(1) is as follows: 'Aggregate  
23 disability *payments for a single injury* occurring on or after April  
24 19, 2004, *causing temporary disability* shall not extend for more  
25 than 104 compensable week within a period of two years *from the*  
26 *date of commencement of temporary disability payment.*' (Italics  
27 added.) Thus, the language itself ties the temporary disability  
indemnity limitations period for any single injury to the temporary  
disability caused by that injury and starts the limitations period on  
the date of commencement of the temporary disability payments  
for such disability." (*Foster, supra*, 73 Cal.Comp.Cases at pp.

1 470-471.) (Footnote omitted.) (Underlining added.)

2 In *Foster*, the Court discussed the history of section 4656 and the changes accomplished by  
3 Senate Bill (SB) 899.

4 “Then in 2004, as part of the sweeping overhaul of the workers’  
5 compensation laws effected by Senate Bill No. 899 (2003-2004  
6 Reg. Sess.), the former provisions of section 4656 were designated  
7 as subdivisions (a) and (b) while subdivision (c)(1) was added to  
8 impose an even more restrictive 104-week/2-year limitation on  
9 temporary disability indemnity payments applicable to both partial  
10 and total temporary disability for a single injury occurring on or  
11 after April 19, 2004. (Stats. 2004, ch. 34, § 29.) Subdivision  
12 (c)(2)<sup>11</sup> was added to continue the 240-week/five-year limitation  
13 for an employee who suffers from certain specifically enumerated  
14 injuries or conditions. (*Ibid.*)

15 Senate Bill No. 899 was enacted as urgency legislation ‘[i]n order  
16 to provide relief to the state from the effects of the current  
17 workers’ compensation crisis at the earliest possible time[.]’  
18 [Stats. 2004, ch. 34, § 49.] It was ‘designed to alleviate a  
19 perceived crisis in skyrocketing workers’ compensation costs.’  
20 (*Brodie v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2007) 40 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 1313,  
21 1329 [156 P.3d 1100, 57 Cal.Rptr. 3d 644, 72 Cal. Comp. Cases  
22 565].) This makes it likely the Legislature intended the new  
23 limitations period in section 4656(c)(1) to be a significant  
24 narrowing of liability.” (73 Cal.Comp.Cases at pp. 471-472.)

25 Section 49 of SB 899 provides,

26 “This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate  
27 preservation of the public peace, health, or safety within the  
28 meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into  
29 immediate effect. The facts constituting the necessity are: [¶] In  
30 order to provide relief to the state from the effects of the current  
31 workers’ compensation crisis at the earliest possible time, it is  
32 necessary for this act to take effect immediately.” (Stats. 2004, ch.  
33 34, § 49.)

34 Like the Court in *Foster*, the Appeals Board considered the Legislature’s intent, as  
35 expressed in section 49, in amending section 4656. We noted, in *Hawkins v. Amberwood Products*

36 <sup>1</sup> After further amendment of section 4656 in 2007, for injuries occurring on or after January 1, 2008, the exceptions  
37 previously contained in subdivision (c)(2) are now found in subdivision (c)(3).

1 (2007) 72 Cal.Comp.Cases 807, 815 (Appeals Board en banc), “the workers’ compensation . . .  
2 reforms [of SB 899] were enacted as urgency legislation to drastically reduce the cost of workers’  
3 compensation insurance,” quoting *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.*  
4 (*Chavez*) (2007) 151 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 148 [72 Cal.Comp.Cases 582, 587]. We concluded, “By placing  
5 a limit of 104 weeks of temporary disability indemnity within two years from the date that payment  
6 commences, the Legislature has furthered the goal of SB 899 to ‘provide relief’ from the workers’  
7 compensation ‘crisis’ and to reduce workers’ compensation costs.” (*Hawkins, supra*, 72  
8 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 815.)

9         Bearing in mind the principles discussed above, we must now ascertain the Legislature’s  
10 intent when it authorized temporary disability benefits beyond the two-year/104 week cap of  
11 subdivision (c)(1) for employees with extended temporary disability, who suffer from one of the  
12 enumerated injuries or conditions. We believe the Legislature’s intent in enacting section  
13 4656(c)(3) was that “aggregate disability payments for a single injury occurring on or after April  
14 19, 2004, causing temporary disability shall not extend for more than 240 compensable weeks  
15 within a period of five years from the date of the injury” when the industrial injury, or the  
16 condition resulting from the industrial injury, is one of the injuries or conditions specified in  
17 subdivisions (c)(3)(A) through (I), and the specified injury or condition is causing the continuing  
18 temporary disability. The specified injury or condition need not be the sole cause. If it is a  
19 contributory cause, the employee is entitled to the extended benefits. (Cf. *Granado v. Workers’*  
20 *Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1970) 69 Cal.2d 399 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 647]; *Gray v. Moss Lighting* (1978)  
21 43 Cal.Comp.Cases 586 (Appeals Board en banc).)

22         This interpretation recognizes that the statutory language ties the temporary disability  
23 indemnity period to the temporary disability caused by the injury, as discussed in *Foster*. It  
24 effectuates the Legislature’s intent to allow a continuation of benefits for employees with certain  
25 specifically enumerated injuries or conditions, by extending those benefits when the specifically  
26 enumerated injury or condition causes temporary disability to persist, and the interpretation is also  
27 consistent with the general intent to narrow liability.



1 Having determined that applicant's eye injury must be causing or contributing to  
2 applicant's continuing temporary disability, in order for him to be entitled to extended payments,  
3 we now consider whether that causation has been demonstrated. Applicant argues, "The psyche  
4 injury is a compensable consequence of the high velocity eye injury...." (Answer to Petition for  
5 Reconsideration, p. 6.) The WCJ says, at page 13 of his Report,

6 "Applicant has not returned to work, nor has it been shown that  
7 suitable modified or alternative work was available to him.  
8 Applicant does not appear to be able to perform his pre-injury  
9 work functions safely as a result of his impaired vision. *Amended  
10 Summary of Evidence 12/18/2008 (Partial Transcript p. 5 lines 14-  
11 20.)* Indeed, the employer's objection to the 'volunteer duties'  
12 Applicant performed at the Center for Neuro Skills appears to have  
13 been the risk for secondary injury, for which they understandably  
14 did not desire to be liable. *Amended Summary of Evidence  
15 12/18/2008 (Partial Transcript p. 7 lines 8-20).*

16 Thus, it is not an accurate statement of the record to indicate that  
17 Applicant's ongoing temporary disability is entirely the result of  
18 the damage to his brain. Injury to his eye and eyesight, while they  
19 may be permanent and stationary when considered in isolation,  
20 nevertheless contribute to the compensable consequences of  
21 Applicant's psychiatric disability, which is not yet stabilized."

22 The testimony referred to by the WCJ is applicant's explanation that physical labor, such as  
23 swinging with picks, would be dangerous for him. Applicant conceded, however, that no doctor  
24 has certified him as temporarily disabled in the last six months as a result of any eye problem.

25 Thus the record establishes that applicant believes certain tasks would be dangerous  
26 because of his impaired vision. The WCJ concluded that applicant's injury to his eye and eyesight  
27 contributes to his inability to work and to the compensable consequence of his psychiatric  
disability. Given applicant's horrendous injury, these beliefs and conclusions seem reasonable; but  
they are not yet proven. There is evidence that applicant is temporarily disabled on a psychiatric  
basis, but there is insufficient evidence to determine whether applicant's eye injury is contributing  
directly to his ongoing temporary disability, or whether his psychiatric compensable consequence  
is in part due to the eye injury. Resolution of these issues requires expert medical opinion, in

1 addition to applicant's testimony.

2 Labor Code sections 5701 and 5906 authorize the WCJ or the Appeals Board to obtain  
3 additional evidence, including medical, at any time during the proceedings. (*Tyler v. Workers'*  
4 *Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 389 [62 Cal.Comp.Cases 924, 926]; *McClune v.*  
5 *Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1117 [63 Cal.Comp.Cases 261, 263];  
6 *McDuffie v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority* (2002) 67 Cal.Comp.Cases 138  
7 (Appeals Board en banc.) Because the record is incomplete on the causes of applicant's current  
8 temporary disability, we will return this matter to the trial level for development of the record and  
9 for a new finding by the WCJ on whether applicant's eye injury is contributing, to any extent, to  
10 his continuing temporary disability. This is not an apportionment issue. If applicant's eye injury,  
11 the existence of which is affirmed by this decision, is found to be a contributing cause of  
12 applicant's ongoing temporary disability, the WCJ may reissue his award of continuing temporary  
13 disability indemnity.

14 Accordingly, we will affirm the findings that applicant sustained a high-velocity eye injury  
15 and that he continues to be temporarily disabled, a finding defendant does not dispute. We will  
16 return the matter to the trial level for development of the record on the issue of his entitlement to  
17 extended temporary disability indemnity. Medical reporting will be necessary to determine  
18 whether applicant's current temporary disability is, to any extent, due to his eye injury and/or  
19 whether his psyche injury and consequent disability is, to any extent, due to the eye injury. We  
20 will, therefore, defer the issues of entitlement to additional temporary disability indemnity and  
21 attorney's fees. The WCJ should issue a new decision on those issues after development of the  
22 record and such further proceedings as he deems appropriate.

23 We will also amend the decision to reflect the correct date of injury. We note that the  
24 WCJ's Report also contained a clerical error in his recommended correction.

25 Finally, despite his thorough discussion of the issue, the WCJ acknowledges in his Report  
26 that the amputation issue was merely mentioned by him in passing and, assuming applicant's tear  
27 duct was removed, "the loss of the tear duct is not sufficient to independently justify the use of the

1 240 week limitation as an 'amputation' within the meaning of Lab.C. §4656{c}(3)[C]." (Report,  
2 p. 16.) In light of our en banc decision in *Cruz v. Mercedes-Benz of San Francisco, supra*, 72  
3 Cal.Comp.Cases 1281, this conclusion appears to be correct; but, as the issue was not raised or  
4 litigated by the parties, we will not discuss it further.

5 For the foregoing reasons,

6 **IT IS ORDERED**, as the Decision After Reconsideration of the Workers' Compensation  
7 Appeals Board, that the January 26, 2009 Findings & Award is **AFFIRMED, EXCEPT** that it is  
8 **AMENDED**, as set forth below:

9 Findings of Fact Nos. 5, 6, and 7 are amended, as follows:

10 **FINDINGS OF FACT**

- 11
- 12 5. As a result of the industrial injury of June 8, 2006, Applicant Judd Glover has been  
13 temporarily totally disabled during the period from June 23, 2008, to the present and  
14 continuing.
- 15 6. The industrial injury of June 8, 2006, was a high-velocity eye injury, within the  
16 meaning of Labor Code section 4656(c)(3)(F).
- 17 7. The issues of entitlement to additional temporary disability indemnity and attorney's  
18 fees are deferred.

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
The Award is amended, as follow:

**AWARD**

Award is made in favor of Applicant Judd Glover and against Defendant Virginia Surety Insurance Company, administered by First Compensation Insurance Company, of:


Such additional and further medical treatment as may be reasonably necessary to cure or relieve Applicant from the effects of his industrial injury.

**WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD**




**GREGORY G. AGHAZARIAN**


*I CONCUR.*



**JAMES C. CUNEO**



**DEIDRA E. LOWE**




**DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA**

**JUN 15 2009**

**SERVICE MADE BY MAIL ON ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES AS SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD:**

- FIDEL MARTINEZ**
- STOCKWELL, HARRIS, WIDOM, WOOLVERTON & MUEHL**
- JUDD GLOVER**



**GLOVER, Judd**